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MAINSTREAM MARKETING SERVICES V. FTC: PRIVACY
INTERESTS TRUMP COMMERCIAL SPEECH IN UPHOLDING
THE NATIONAL Do-NOT-CALL REGISTRY
INTRODUCTION
On February 17, 2004, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals delivered
an opinion that places privacy interests in the home above the constitu-
tional protections commonly afforded to commercial speech. In Main-
stream Marketing Services, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission,1 the court
considered the constitutional validity of a government regulation prohib-
iting most commercial telemarketers from calling telephone numbers on
a national list.
2
The Do-Not-Call Implementation Act ("Do-Not-Call Act") 3 repre-
sents a governmental intervention that paternalistically protects individ-
ual privacy against nongovernmental intrusions. The Do-Not-Call Act
authorized the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") to implement, en-
force, and administer a national do-not-call registry.4 Additionally, the
Do-Not-Call Act ordered the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") to consult and coordinate with the FTC to maximize consis-
tency in the do-not-call regulations of both government agencies.5 In
Mainstream Marketing, the Tenth Circuit consolidated four cases from
several jurisdictions challenging various aspects of the national do-not-
call registry. 6 Each challenge was refuted and the Do-Not-Call Act was
upheld in its entirety. Since the Supreme Court denied certiorari for
Mainstream Marketing,8 the constitutional validity of the Do-Not-Call
Act has been affirmed, allowing a new means for individuals to prohibit
commercial speech in their homes.
"We live in a remarkably commercialized culture, one that has con-
stantly been changing but, for the moment, whose commercialization
1. 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 47 (2004).
2. See Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1232.
3. Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 6101 (2003).
4. Id.
5. Id. at § 4.
6. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1236. Case No. 03-1429 is an appeal from the District of
Colorado, which held that the FTC's do-not-call rules were unconstitutional on First Amendment
grounds. Id. at 1236 n.9. Case No. 03-6258 is an appeal from the Western District of Oklahoma,
which held that the FTC lacked statutory authority to enact its do-not-call rules. Id. Additionally,
Case No. 03-9571 and Case No. 03-9594 regarding the Federal Communications Commission Order
were reviewed pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2342. Id. Case Nos. 03-1429, 03-
6258, and 03-9571 involved First Amendment challenges. Id. at 1236. Case No. 03-9594 involved
challenges to the Federal Communications Commission rule's "established business relationship
exception" on administrative law grounds. Id.
7. Id. at 1236.
8. 125 S. Ct. 47 (2004).
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seems inevitable."9 Some ways of living are less commercialized than
others, but the "cultural predominance of commercialism" is undeni-
able.' o However, at some point, the privacy of consumers becomes a
greater concern for Congress than the constitutional protections of an
advertiser's commercial speech. This Article discusses the holding in
Mainstream Marketing, focusing on the privacy interest of consumers
and the commercial speech guarantees of telemarketers that are at odds
with each other in this appeal.
Part I of this Article provides a background of the commercial
speech protections and privacy interests that frame the constitutional
challenges to the national do-not-call registry. Part II examines the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Mainstream Marketing. In this part, the leg-
islative history and key aspects of the national do-not-call registry are
discussed in detail. Part III provides a critical analysis of the Tenth Cir-
cuit's opinion and Congress's decision to promulgate legislation leading
to the do-not-call registry. Additionally, Part III analyzes the implica-
tions toward television commercials in light of technological advances in
telecommunications equipment, statutory initiatives directed toward
Internet advertising, and the Mainstream Marketing holding. This part
illustrates how technological advances resulting from convergence in the
telecommunications industry could potentially be used for privacy regu-
lations of television commercials at some time in the future. In conclu-
sion, this Article asserts three things: (1) the Tenth Circuit correctly ap-
plied the law governing commercial speech regulations to the national
do-not-call registry; (2) Congress should have let market forces deal with
the privacy concerns of consumers; and (3) Congress's choice to regulate
should be cause for concern among broadcasters and video service pro-
viders.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The First Amendment's Protection of Commercial Speech
The First Amendment of the Constitution secures the right of free
speech to every individual." The protection accompanying this right is
afforded to both the speaker and its recipients. 2 While any speech may
be regulated, the degree of judicial scrutiny that governmentally regu-
lated speech must satisfy under the First Amendment usually depends on
whether the speech "is classified as 'commercial' or 'noncommercial'
9. R. GEORGE WRIGHT, SELLING WORDS: FREE SPEECH IN A COMMERCIAL CULTURE 13-14
(1997).
10. Id. at 14.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I. (stating "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances").
12. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S 748, 756 (1976).
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.... ,,13 "[R]egulation of political speech and other so-called 'fully pro-
tected' speech must survive strict constitutional scrutiny ... How-
ever, commercial speech, when regulated, "has usually been subjected to
... less rigorous" judicial scrutiny.' 5
Although a relatively new canon, speech that "propose[s] a com-
mercial transaction" is protected by the First Amendment.16 In fact, the
Supreme Court indicated that commercial speech may be more important
to individuals than certain political speech.' 7  Additionally, our "pre-
dominantly free enterprise economy" actually makes commercial speech
pertinent to the political process. 18 The free flow of information, to
which commercial speech largely contributes, serves to "enlighten public
decisionmaking" in a democratic society.19 While commercial speech,
like other varieties of speech, is protected under the Constitution, the
Court has acknowledged that it may be regulated.2 °
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commis-
sion,21 the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of when
government may regulate commercial speech.22 In Central Hudson, the
New York Public Service Commission ordered electrical utilities to
'cease all advertising" designed to increase demand for electricity. 23
While enacted during a fuel crisis, the New York Public Service Com-
mission sought to continue the order banning promotional advertising
after "the fuel shortage had eased .... Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. opposed the continued banning of promotional advertising on First
Amendment grounds. 25  The Court held that the "total ban on promo-
tional advertising" violated Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.'s First
13. See P. CAMERON DEVORE & ROBERT D. SACK, ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL
SPEECH: A FIRST AMENDMENT GUIDE §2:1 (perm. ed., release no. 4 2003).
14. Id. Strict scrutiny requires government to prove the regulation has a compelling interest
that is directly advanced by the least restrictive means available. Id. (referring to Reno v. Am. Civil
Liberties Union, 588 U.S. 844, 868 (1997)).
15. DEVORE & SACK, supra note 13, §2:1; see also id. §2:1, at 2-2 n.3 (noting a degree of
"intermediate scrutiny" applied to government restrictions on commercial speech),
16. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762.
17. Id. at 763 (noting that a "particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial
information... may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent politi-
cal debate").
18. Id. at 765. Spending in a free market society is largely "made through numerous private
economic decisions." Id. Therefore, it is a "matter of public interest that those decisions, in the
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed." id. Product advertising, "however ... excessive it
sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information." Id. (emphasis added).
19. Id. (arguing that commercial speech passes even the most restrictive test, one which
requires speech to enlighten public decision making in a democracy before being afforded constitu-
tional protection).
20. Id. at 770.
21. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
22. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63.
23. Id. at 558. The order was based on the New York Public Service Commission's findings
that the utility system in New York State did not have sufficient reserves during a fuel shortage from
1973 to 1976 to meet customer demands. Id. at 559.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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Amendment rights and reversed the New York Public Service Commis-
sion's order.
26
In striking down the New York Public Service Commission's order,
the Supreme Court "purported to synthesize the rule of law established"
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and later commercial speech deci-
sions. 27 Traditionally, the Court had provided less constitutional protec-
tion to commercial speech than the protection afforded other types of
expression because commerce in general is an area commonly subject to
regulation by the government. 28  The constitutional guarantee that does
exist is rooted in the First Amendment, which protects commercial
,,29
speech to safeguard the "informational function of advertisement.
The extent of constitutional protection available to a "particular commer-
cial expression turns on the nature both of the expression and of the gov-
ernmental interests served by its regulation. 3°
In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court established a four-part test to
determine when the government may regulate commercial speech. 1 The
first element of the Central Hudson test is satisfied when the commercial
speech sought to be regulated is indeed speech protected by the First
Amendment.32 To be protected by the First Amendment, the speech in
question must not be misleading or unlawful.33 The second element of
the Central Hudson test requires that the government "assert a substantial
interest to be achieved" by the speech-banning regulation.
34
The third and fourth elements of the Central Hudson test "are de-
signed to measure the appropriateness of the ... regulation in relation to
the government's substantial interest."35 The third element of the test
requires that the speech-banning regulation directly advance the govern-
mental interest. 36 The regulation must do more than provide "only inef-
fective or remote support" for the government's asserted purpose.37 The
26. Id. at 571-72. The Court noted that its holding did not consider the powers that a state
may have over utility advertising in emergency situations. Id. at 572 n.15.
27. DEVORE & SACK, supra note 13, §3:12, at 3-26.
28. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63.
29. Id. at 563 (emphasis added). While many advertisements communicate true but incom-
plete information, "the First Amendment presumes that some accurate information is better than no
information at all." Id. at 562. Consequently, there can be no constitutional protection afforded to
advertisements relating to unlawful activity or containing misleading information. Id. at 563.
30. Id. at 563.
31. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.3.7.3 (2d ed. 2002).
The Central Hudson test is very similar, if not identical, to "intermediate scrutiny" in evaluating
government regulation of truthful advertising. Id. The Tenth Circuit articulates the Central Hudson
test as a three-part test presuming that the first element, only advertising that is not false or deceptive
or of illegal activity may be protected, has been met. See Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1237.
32. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
33. Id. at 566.
34. Id. at 564.
35. See HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW § 3.3.A (1999).
36. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
37. Id. at 564.
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fourth and final element of the Central Hudson test requires that the
speech-banning regulation be narrowly tailored so it does not restrict
more speech than necessary. 38 "[I]f the governmental interest [can] be
served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, [any]
excessive restrictions cannot survive" under the First Amendment.
39
Essentially, the third and fourth elements of Central Hudson test require
that a reasonable fit exists between the government's objectives and the
means it chooses to accomplish those ends.4°
B. Residential Privacy
"The ancient concept that 'a man's home is his castle' into which
'not even the king may enter' has lost none of its vitality .... In con-
temporary American jurisprudence, the right of privacy is sacrosanct
within one's home.42 While often subject to unwanted speech in public,
individuals enjoy the ability to avoid such intrusions within their own
walls. 43  This special benefit, the ability to control unwanted speech
within the home, is one that the government may protect on behalf of its
citizens.44
Privacy in the home "was originally conceptualized as a bulwark
against the force of the state and is embodied in the Fourth Amendment
",45.... The Fourth Amendment "guarantee[s] the right of the people to
be secure in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects' against unreason-
able searches and seizures." 46 The long history of privacy in one's home
from governmental intrusions "has evolved into a broader concept [of
residential privacy] in which the home is [deemed] essential to one's
",47autonomy ....
38. Id.
39. id. However, the selected regulation need not be the least restrictive means available to
advance the government's interest. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, § 11.3.7.3 (noting that Justice
Scalia expressly rejected that the "least restrictive alternative test" be used in commercial speech
regulations).
40. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-65; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31,
§ 11.3.7.3.
41. Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970).
42. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (stressing previous Supreme Court deci-
sions had "repeatedly held that individuals are not required to welcome unwanted speech into their
own homes").
43. Id. at 484-85.
44. Id.
45. Brief of Amici Curiae of Undersigned Members of the United States Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation § IA, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Mainstream Mktg. Serv.,
358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1429) [hereinafter Senate Committee Brief].
46. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
47. See id. The Senate Committee expresses this powerful privacy interest by quoting Judge
Jerome Frank's dissenting opinion in United States v. On Lee:
A man can still control a small part of his environment, his house; he can retreat thence
from outsiders, secure in the knowledge that they cannot get at him without disobeying
the Constitution. That is still a sizable hunk of liberty-worth protecting from encroach-
ment. A sane, decent, civilized society must provide some such oasis, some shelter from
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In Frisby v. Schult, 48 the town of Brookfield, Wisconsin, enacted
an ordinance making it unlawful for a person to picket at an individual's
residence or dwelling. 49 The primary purpose of the ordinance was to
"protect and preserve" the privacy in one's home.50 Shultz and others,
who were strongly opposed to abortion and wished to picket on a public
street outside the Brookfield residence of a doctor who supposedly per-
formed abortions, alleged that the ordinance violated the First Amend-
ment.5
The Supreme Court first noted that "[t]he antipicketing ordinance
operates at the core of the First Amendment" because it prohibits indi-
viduals from engaging in expression regarding "an issue of public con-
cern." 52 Next, the Court focused on the forum that the speaker sought to
employ in order to ascertain what limits may be placed on the protected
expression. 53 In finding that the streets of Brookfield are traditional pub-
lic fora, the antipicketing ordinance was judged under the most "stringent
standards" established for regulations on speech.54
The Court determined that the antipicketing ordinance enacted by
Brookfield was narrowly tailored, served a significant government inter-
est, and left open "ample alternative channels of communication .. .
First, the Brookfield ordinance was narrowly tailored to protect unwilling
listeners because the picketing ban was specifically directed "at the
public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is a
man's castle.
Id. But cf, Lee C. Milstein, Fortress of Solitude or Lair of Malevolence? Rethinking the Desirability
of Bright-Line Protection of the Home, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1789, 1791 (2003) (arguing that declaring
scanning activity unconstitutional when it targets a specific area like the home indicates a problem-
atic scheme for identifying unconstitutional searches and should be permitted when little or no
intrusion to the individual occurs).
48. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
49. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 474.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 474, 476.
52. Id. at 479. However, the Court qualified that "even protected speech is not equally per-
missible in all places at all times." Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc.,
473 U.S. 788,799 (1985)).
53. Id. The Court has identified three types of fora: "the traditional public forum, the public
forum created by government designation, and the nonpublic forum." Id. at 479-80 (quoting Corne-
lius, 473 U.S. at 802). The standards by which limitations on protected expression must be evalu-
ated differ depending on type of forum at issue. Id. at 479 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983)).
54. Id. at 481. "The appropriate level of scrutiny is initially tied to whether the statute distin-
guishes between prohibited and permitted speech on the basis of content." Id. The Court determined
that the antipicketing ordinance was content neutral. Id. at 482. Therefore, the appropriate test was
to determine "whether the ordinance was 'narrowly tailored to serve a significant government inter-
est' and whether it 'leave[s] open ample alternative channels of communication,"' as opposed to the
test for content-based regulations, which would have required the ordinance to be necessary to serve
a compelling government interest that is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Id at 481-82 (citing
Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45).
55. Id. at 488.
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household, not the public., 56 Second, the Court noted that the govern-
mental "interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of
the home" is certainly significant as it is "of the highest order in a free
and civilized society." 57 An "important aspect of residential privacy" is
the government's role in protecting unwilling listeners from unwanted
speech in the comfort of their homes.58 Although expected to simply
avoid speech in many locations, individuals do not have to bear that bur-
den at home. 59 Third, ample channels of communication were left open
because the Brookfield ordinance uses the singular form of the words
"residence" and "dwelling" indicating that "the ordinance is intended to
prohibit only picketing" targeted at a particular residence. 60  General
dissemination of a message was still permissible under the antipicketing
ordinance since protestors had not been barred from the streets of the
residential neighborhoods. 6' Thus, the Court concluded, the facial chal-
lenge to the antipicketing ordinance failed because the elements required
for a constitutionally valid content-neutral regulation speech were met.62
In Frisby, the Supreme Court declared that "[tihere simply is no
right to force speech into the home of an unwilling listener. ' 63 This prin-
ciple of privacy in the home is "reflected even in prior decisions in which
[the Court] invalidated complete bans on expressive activity .... -64
Therefore, when the regulatory method to control unwanted speech
56. Id. at 485-86 (emphasis added). The Court noted that a complete ban can be narrowly
tailored only if each activity within the proscription's scope is appropriately targeted at the exact
source of "evil" sought to be remedied. Id. at 485.
57. Id. at 484 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)).
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Id. at 482.
61. Id. at 483-84. The traditional public fora of the residential streets and sidewalks are open
to protestors, alone or in groups, should they (1) go marching, (2) go door-to-door to proselytize
their views, (3) distribute literature door-to-door or by mail, or (4) contact residents by telephone. Id.
at 484.
62. See id. at 488.
63. Id. at 485. But see Fred H. Cate & Robert Litan, Constitutional Issues In Information
Privacy, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 35, 49 (2002), available at
http://www.mttlr.org/volnine/Cate-Litan.pdf (stating that many times the Court has upheld the right
to speak irrespective of the asserted privacy right) (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
The First Amendment is ... also a significant restraint on the government's power to re-
strict the publication or communication of information. The Supreme Court has decided
many cases in which individuals sought to stop, or obtain damages for, the publication of
private information, or in which the government restricted expression in an effort to pro-
tect privacy. Virtually without exception, the Court has upheld the right to speak or pub-
lish or protest under the First Amendment, to the detriment of the asserted privacy inter-
est. For example, the Court has rejected privacy claims by unwilling viewers or listeners
in the context broadcasts of radio programs in city streetcars, R-rated movies at a drive-in
theater, [as well as] ... [striking] down ordinances that would require affirmative opt-in
consent before receiving door-to-door solicitations, Communist literature, or even "pat-
ently offensive" cable programming.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
64. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485; see, e.g., Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1943) (not-
ing that when the door-to-door ban enacted by the city of Struthers was invalidated, it was done on
the basis that the home owners could protect themselves from such intrusions by placing an appro-
priate no-solicitation sign on their doors).
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within the home does not involve a complete ban, it is more likely to be
constitutionally valid.65
II. MAINSTREAM MARKETING SERVICES, INC. V. FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION'
In Mainstream Marketing, a consolidated appeal of four cases,67 the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decisions and
held that the national do-not-call registry validly regulated commercial
speech.68  The Tenth Circuit determined that the Do-Not-Call Act "di-
rectly advance[ed] the government's important interests in safeguarding
personal privacy and reducing the danger of telemarketing abuse without
burdening an excessive amount of speech., 69  In terms of the Central
Hudson test, there was a "reasonable fit between the do-not-call regula-
tions and the government's reasons for enacting them.,
70
A. Facts and Procedural History
Telemarketing companies provide work for "roughly 5.4 million
persons in the United States" and generate approximately "$275 billion
dollars annually ... ,,71 For-profit and non-profit organizations, such as
commercial corporations, religious groups, charities, and political par-
ties, "generate revenue by calling individuals in their homes and solicit-
ing sales and donations., 72  Most of these organizations hire "telemar-
keting companies that operate call-centers to make solicitations on their
behalf."73 Congress recognized that the large growth in telemarketers, in
conjunction with new telecommunications technologies that permitted
telemarketing companies to make a greater volume of calls, raised resi-
dential privacy concerns for telephone consumers.74 Further, "[s]tudies
presented to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation indicated that only 0.1% of the population likes to receive
65. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485; see also supra text accompanying note 56.
66. 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004).
67. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1232.
68. Id. at 1232-33. Judge Ebel also held that (1) the annual access fees that telemarketers
were required to pay were a "permissible regulatory measure" to offset projected administrative
expenses; (2) the FCC had not acted in an "arbitrary and capricious manner in adopting the estab-
lished business relationship exception" to the national do-not-call registry; and (3) the FrC had
"statutory authority to promulgate" the Do-Not-Call Act regulations. Id. at 1248, 1250.
69. Id. at 1233.
70. See id.
71. Mainstream Mktg. Services, Inc. v. FTC, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1154 (D. Colo. 2003),
rev'd, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004). These employment and revenue figures were accurate prior
to the Tenth Circuit's opinion upholding the national do-not-call registry.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 1154-55.
74. James Sweet, Opting-Out Of Commercial Telemarketing: The Constitutionality Of The
National Do-Not-Call Registry, 70 TENN. L. REV. 921,931 (2003).
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unsolicited telephone" calls, and many consumers favor some regulation
of these unsolicited calls.75
Congress was particularly concerned with the privacy issues raised
by commercial telemarketers because the record "d[id] not contain suffi-
cient evidence to demonstrate that calls from [charitable and political]
organizations should be subject to the restrictions provided for under the
bill. 76 The report proffered by the House Committee included statistics
compiled by the National Association of Consumer Agency Administra-
tors which indicated that the "vast majority of complaints [were] about
commercial telephone solicitations." 7  Because the record before Con-
gress suggested that "most unwanted telephone solicitations [were]
commercial in nature[,]" Congress found consumer-based support to
treat commercial telephone solicitations and charitable and political so-
licitations differently under its do-not-call regulations.78
In response to these consumer concerns, Congress first passed the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 ("TCPA"), which gave the
FCC authority to enact rules to limit the telemarketing sales calls that
many telephone subscribers consider an "intrusive invasion of privacy.
"The purpose of the bill ... is to protect residential telephone subscriber
privacy rights by restricting certain commercial solicitation and advertis-
ing uses of the telephone and related telecommunications equipment. ' 80
Finding the TCPA regulations insufficient, Congress passed the Do-Not-
Call Act, which directed the FTC and FCC to promulgate rules that cre-
ated the national do-not-call registry. 81 This registry is the result of a
regulatory effort spanning thirteen years aimed at protecting the privacy
82rights of consumers.
The national do-not-call registry is a database containing the tele-
phone numbers of individuals who "do not wish to receive unsolicited
75. Sweet, supra note 74, at 932. Although such studies lend support Congress' decision to
regulate telemarketers' unsolicited calls, whether the general population likes or dislikes a certain
kind of speech is not a persuasive argument in favor of regulation. In fact, the Supreme Court has
stated that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the govern-
ment may not prohibit expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). A poll of Texas citizens with respect to
flag burning regulations would likely result in similar, if not stronger, support for such a government
intervention.
76. Sweet, supra note 74, at 932 (quoting the House Committee on Energy and Commerce in
H.R. REP. No. 102-317, at 16).
77. Id. The House Committee additionally noted that "noncommercial telephone solicitations
[were] more expected, and that noncommercial speech was 'core' First Amendment speech." Id. at
933.
78. See id. at 932 (quoting the House Committee on Energy and Commerce in H.R. REP. No.
102-317, at 16).
79. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1235.
80. H.R. REP. No. 102-317, at 5 (1991). The bill "is designed to return a measure of control
to ... individual residential telephone customers[,]" not "to make all unsolicited telemarketing...
illegal." Id. at 6.
81. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1233-34.
82. Id. at 1235.
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calls from commercial telemarketers. '83  Once an individual has placed
his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry,
"[c]ommercial telemarketers are generally prohibited from calling" that
individual's telephone number.84 By the time this case came before the
Tenth Circuit, approximately 50 million telephone numbers had been
placed on this registry. 85 To fund the associated administrative costs of
the do-not-call regulations, each commercial telemarketer must pay an
annual access fee.86
The lead plaintiff in the case, Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc.
("Mainstream"),87 filed a complaint in United States District Court for
the District of Colorado, seeking an injunction prohibiting the FTC's
application and enforcement of the do-not-call regulations that were to
go into effect on October 1, 2003.88 Mainstream alleged, inter alia, that
the national do-not-call registry violated the First Amendment because it
unconstitutionally targets commercial speech by telemarketers, but it
does not apply to charitable and political callers. 89 Mainstream asserted
that the First Amendment does not permit the FTC "to impose regula-
tions that discriminatorily restrict commercial speech in order to serve an
asserted interest unrelated to the commercial nature of the speech. 9 °
The district court held that the FTC regulations relating to the do-not-call
registry violated the First Amendment's protection of free speech be-
cause the rules created an impermissible content-based distinction be-
tween different categories of speech.91 Because the do-not-call registry
created a burden on the speech of commercial telemarketers "without a
logical, coherent privacy-based or prevention-of-abuse-based reason
83. Id. at 1234.
84. Id. Telemarketers are only "generally prohibited from calling telephone numbers" on the
national do-not-call registry because they "may call consumers who have signed up for the national
registry if [the seller for whom the telemarketer represents] has an established business relationship
with the consumer or if the consumer has given that seller express written permission to call." Id.
(emphasis added).
85. Id.
86. Id. Currently, the annual national do-not-call registry fee is $25 per area code of telephone
number data. Id. at 1246. However, "the first five area codes are provided free of charge and the
maximum annual fee is capped at $7,375." Id. at 1246-47.
87. Mainstream Mktg., 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1155. Other co-plaintiffs include TMG Marketing,
another telemarketing company, and the American Teleservices Association, a national non-profit
association of telemarketing companies which represent its members' commercial interests and
engages in self-regulation of the telemarketing industry. Id.
88. Id. at 1156. The initial complaint was filed on January 29, 2003. Id. at 1158. On Febru-
ary 28, 2003, Mainstream Marketing Services filed a motion for a preliminary injunction which was
subsequently withdrawn after filing their motion for summary judgment on May 23, 2003. Id. On
August 5, 2003, the complaint was amended to state claims against the FTC based on the new do-
not-call registry fees. Id.
89. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1238.
90. See Reply to Opp'n to Pet. for a Writ of Cert. at 1, Mainstream Mktg. Services, Inc. v.
FTC, 125 S. Ct. 47 (No. 03-1552) (2004) (emphasis added). Mainstream Marketing Services argues
that the do-not-call regulations should not be evaluated under Central Hudson, but rather "evaluated
under the standards applicable to regulations of fully protected speech." Id. (quoting City of Cincin-
nati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 436 (1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
91. Mainstream Mktg., 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1168.
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supporting the disparate treatment" of the speech of charitable and politi-
cal telemarketers, the district court concluded that the speech-banning
regulations failed the third element of the Central Hudson test requiring




The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
holding. 93 The Tenth Circuit held that First Amendment requirements
for banning commercial speech under the Central Hudson test were satis-
fied because the do-not-call registry (1) restricted "only core commercial
speech[,]" (2) targeted "speech that invades the privacy of the home," (3)
was an "opt-in program that puts the choice of whether or not to restrict
commercial calls entirely in the hands of consumers[,]" and (4) "materi-
ally further[ed] the government's interests in combating the danger of
abusive telemarketing and preventing the invasion of consumer privacy
[by] blocking a significant number of the calls that cause these prob-
lems." 94 Further supporting the constitutionality of the FTC's regula-
tions, Judge Ebel noted:
A number of additional features of the national do-not-call registry,
although not dispositive, further demonstrate that the list is consistent
with the First Amendment rights of commercial speakers. The chal-
lenged regulations do not hinder any business' ability to contact con-
sumers by other means, such as through direct mailings or other
forms of advertising. Moreover, they give consumers a number of
different options to avoid calls they do not want to receive. Namely,
consumers who wish to restrict some but not all commercial sales
calls can do so by using company-specific do-not-call lists or by
granting some businesses express permission to call. In addition, the
government chose to offer consumers broader options to restrict
commercial sales calls than charitable and political calls after finding
that commercial calls were more intrusive and posed a greater danger
of consumer abuse. The government also had evidence that the less
restrictive company-specific do-not-call list did not solve the prob-
lems caused by commercial telemarketing, but it had no comparable
evidence with respect to charitable and political fundraising.
95
Just as a homeowner "can avoid door-to-door peddlers by placing a 'No
Solicitation' sign in his or her front yard," the national do-not-call regis-
try offers individuals a tool with which they can protect their homes
92. Id.
93. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1251. The constitutionality of the national do-not-call
registry and its fees under the First Amendment were reviewed de novo by the court of appeals. Id.
at 1236.
94. Id. at 1233.
95. Id.
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against intrusions that Congress has determined to be particularly inva-
sive.
9 6
The national do-not-call regulations are content-based restrictions
on commercial speech. 97 To determine whether the national do-not-call
registry was a valid regulation of commercial speech, the circuit court
applied the Central Hudson test.98 Further, the circuit court noted that
"[t]he government bears the burden of asserting one or more substantial
governmental interests and demonstrating a reasonable fit between those
interests and the challenged regulation." 99 However, the "government is
not limited in the evidence it may use to meet its burden[J" and the na-
tional do-not-call registry could "be justified by anecdotes, history, con-
sensus, or simple common sense. ' °
Applying the First Amendment's protection to only truthful tele-
marketing calls,' l the circuit court bypassed the first element of the Cen-
tral Hudson test. The circuit court determined that the government-
asserted interests in protecting the "privacy of individuals in their
homes". and "protecting consumers against the risk of fraudulent and
abusive solicitation" were substantial and justified.10 2  Supreme Court
cases involving residential privacy have repeatedly recognized that the
government's "interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and pri-
vacy of the home is certainly of the highest order. . . , Additionally,
the Court has recognized a substantial governmental interest in "prevent-
ing abusive and coercive sales practices."' 4 Thus, the circuit court con-
cluded that either government-asserted interest "undisputedly" met the
second element of the Central Hudson test.
10 5
Moving to the third and fourth elements of the Central Hudson test,
the circuit court analyzed whether a "reasonable fit" existed between the
national do-not-call registry and the governmental interests, "privacy and
consumer protection interests[,]" which were advanced on behalf of indi-
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1236.
98. Id. The Central Hudson test is perhaps most difficult to apply when the government
"seeks to regulate truthful, nondeceptive advertising of legal activities in order to achieve other
goals." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, § 11.3.7.7, at 896. In each instance where the government
determines it necessary to regulate commercial speech, the restrictions are based on the premise
"that people will be better off with less information." Id. This concept is seemingly "at odds with
the very core of the First Amendment." Id.
99. Id. at 1237 (citing Utah Licensed Beverage Ass'n v. Leavitt, 256 F.3d 1061, 1069 (10th
Cir. 2001)).
100. See id. (citing Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995)).
101. See supra note 31.
102. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1237.
103. Id. at 1237-38. The court noted that the Supreme Court has stressed the unique nature of
the home and the heightened privacy that exists in the confines of one's home. Id. (citing Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970)).
104. Id. at 1238 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,768-69 (1993)).
105. Id. at 1237.
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viduals who are telephone consumers. 10 6 Unlike the district court, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the national do-not-call
registry was a reasonable fit because it directly advanced the governmen-
tal interests and was narrowly tailored.
The circuit court addressed the telemarketers' argument that the na-
tional do-not-call registry is "unconstitutionally underinclusive because
[it] does not apply to charitable and political solicitations.' ' 7 The circuit
court stressed that "First Amendment challenges based on underinclu-
siveness face an uphill battle in the commercial speech context.' ' 0 8 As a
matter of common sense, the government cannot be required to "regulate
all aspects of a problem before it can make progress on any front."' 9
"The underinclusiveness of a commercial speech regulation is relevant
only if it renders the regulatory framework so irrational that it fails mate-
rially to advance the aims that it was purportedly designed to further."" 0
In City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,"' the Supreme Court "struck
down a law prohibiting commercial newsracks on public property, pur-
portedly to promote the safety and attractive appearance of its streets and
sidewalks.' 12 The key factual distinction between Mainstream Market-
ing and Discovery Network was the effectiveness of the two government
regulations."t 3 The commercial speech ban in Discovery Network ap-
plied to "only 62 of the 1,500 to 2,000 newsracks in the city, thus ad-
dressing only a 'minute' and 'paltry' share of the problem" that the gov-
ernment asserted it was attempting to remedy.' '4
In stark contrast, the national do-not-call registry goes to the root of
the problem and directly advances the government goal "to reduce intru-
sions into personal privacy and the risk of telemarketing fraud and abuse
that accompany unwanted telephone solicitation.""' 5 While the do-not-
call list will not block every unwanted call into the home, a substantial
number of unwanted calls will be prohibited by the regulation. 1 6 The
circuit court concluded that the national do-not-call registry satisfied the
third element of the Central Hudson test proclaiming that it is "difficult
106. Id. at 1238.
107. See id.; see also Brief For The Respondent In Opposition at 17, Mainstream Mktg. (No.
03-1552) (noting that Mainstream Marketing Service's arguments were mischaracterized as only
indicating that the do-not-call registry was "fatally underinclusive").
108. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1238.
109. Id. (citing United States v. Eagle Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418,434 (1993)). In Eagle Broad.,
the Supreme Court stated that "[w]ithin the bounds of the general protection provided by the Consti-
tution to commercial speech, we allow room for legislative judgments." Eagle Broad., 509 U.S. at
434.
110. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1238-39 (citing Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S.
476, 489 (1995) (emphasis added)).
IIl. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
112. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1239.
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1240.
116. 1.
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to fathom how the registry could be called an 'ineffective' means of
stopping invasive or abusive calls, or a regulation that 'furnish[es] only
speculative or marginal support' for the government's interests."
1'1 7
Next, the circuit court addressed the fourth element of the Central
Hudson test. A commercial speech regulation is narrowly tailored if it
"promotes a substantial governmental interest that would be achieved
less effectively absent the regulation."1' 8 Recognizing that the govern-
ment was not required to use the least restrictive means available, the
circuit court considered whether "numerous and obvious alternatives"
existed that would limit less speech while serving the "government's
interest as effectively" as the national do-not-call registry.
1 9
The fourth element of the Central Hudson test was met because the
national do-not-call registry did not regulate more constitutionally pro-
tected speech than necessary.1 20 The circuit court noted that the national
do-not-call registry "restrict[ed] only calls that were targeted at unwilling
listeners." 12  The national do-not-call registry prohibited telemarketing
calls that were commercial in nature intended for individuals who have
"affirmatively indicated that they do not want to receive such calls" in
their homes and "for whom such telemarketing calls would constitute an
intrusion of their privacy."1 22 Focusing on the opt-in feature of the na-
tional do-not-call registry, the circuit court commented that the "Supreme
Court had repeatedly held that speech regulations based on private choice
... are less restrictive than laws that prohibit speech directly."' 2 3 In fact,
the Court has often reasoned that an opt-in version of a regulation is a
way to show that the law in question was not narrowly tailored.
24
In sum, the national do-not-call registry was a reasonable fit be-
tween the government's means and ends because the government's inter-
ests were advanced by effectively blocking a significant number of the
calls that cause the problems the government sought to redress, and the
government did not suppress an excessive amount of speech because the
opt-in character ensures that it does not inhibit any speech directed at the
home of a willing listener.
1 25
117. Id.




121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Id. (citing Hill v. Colo., 530 U.S. 703, 716-17 (2000)).
123. Id.
124. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1240. The court also discusses Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, 147-49 (1943), explaining that there 'the Court struck down a city ordinance prohibit-
ing door-to-door canvassing" by reasoning "that the govemment's interest could have been achieved
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HI. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In Mainstream Marketing, the Tenth Circuit elevated privacy inter-
ests in the home to a powerful fundamental right, which can easily trump
the constitutional protections courts commonly afford to commercial
speech. While the Tenth Circuit's analysis focused primarily on demon-
strating that the national do-not-call registry was a valid regulation of
commercial speech, Mainstream Marketing speaks volumes toward the
value placed on privacy in the home. The commercial speech proscribed
by the do-not-call registry is substantial.126 A victory over a significant
commercial enterprise, like the telemarketing industry, shows exactly
how strong of a constitutionally protected right privacy in the home has
become. 27 After Mainstream Marketing, one's home has almost be-
come sovereign territory into which neither government nor the private
sector may enter.
A. The Tenth Circuit's Decision Was a Correct Analysis of Commercial
Speech Regulations Involving Telecommunications
Mainstream Marketing was a case of first impression with relation
to the First Amendment commercial speech rights of telemarketers.
However, other circuit courts have upheld similar telecommunications
regulations. 128 As telecommunications advertising grew exponentially in
the 1990s, a variety of regulations were enacted, aimed at regulating the
use of rapidly evolving media technology.' 29
In Missouri v. American Blast Fax, Inc., 30 the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals concluded that the TCPA provision banning unsolicited fax
126. The do-not-call list not only prohibits a "significant number of commercial sales calls, but
also a significant percentage of all calls causing the problems that Congress sought to address
(whether commercial, charitable or political)." Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1240 (emphasis added
to significant). "[A]bsent the do-not-call registry, telemarketers would call consumers who have
already signed up for the registry an estimated total of 6.85 billion times each year." Id.
127. See discussion supra Part 1.B; see also Michael E. Shannon, Note, Combating Unsolicited
Sales Calls: The "Do-Not-Call" Approach to Solving the Telemarketing Problem, 27 J. LEGIS. 381,
384 (2001) (stating that "reasonable regulation of telemarketing ... is unlikely to trigger intense
constitutional debate" because the "courts have consistently held that an individual's privacy" rights
are at the highest in the home).
128. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1246 n.13. The Tenth Circuit specifically points out the
Ninth Circuit decisions in Destination Ventures, Ltd v. FCC., 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995), and Moser
v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995), as consistent with the Tenth Circuit's holding in Mainstream
Mktg. Id. In both cases, the Ninth Circuit concluded that provisions of the TCPA, the ban on fax
advertising in Destination Ventures and the prerecorded voice machines in Moser, did not violate the
First Amendment even though noncommercial speech was causing the same problems as commer-
cial speech. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 57; Moser, 46 F.3d at 974. The Ninth Circuit indicated
that the First Amendment did not require the govemment to "make progress on every front before it
can make progress on any front." Moser, 46 F.3d at 974 (quoting Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 434).
Further, the Tenth Circuit identified the Eight Circuit decision in Missouri v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc.,
323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003), as a similarly consistent holding. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1246
n.13.
129. See generally DEVORE & SACK, supra note 13, § 11:3.
130. 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003).
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advertisements satisfied the Central Hudson test. 31 American Blast Fax,
Inc. and Fax.com ("fax companies") provided promotional services for
their clients by transmitting advertisements to fax machines of potential
customers. 32 "In response to numerous consumer complaints, [the state
of] Missouri sought injunctions and civil penalties against the [fax] com-
panies," alleging that they had violated § 227(b)(1)(C) of the TCPA pro-
vision making it unlawful to send unsolicited fax advertisements.'
33
The fax companies argued that § 227(b)(1)(C) of the TCPA was an
unconstitutional restriction on their freedom of speech. 134 The lower
court decided that the legislative record was insufficient to decide the
constitutional questions. 135 After the court ordered an evidentiary hear-
ing and granted the intervention to the United States government, evi-
dence indicated that unsolicited fax advertising shifts costs to the recipi-
ents who are forced to contribute ink, paper, wear and tear on their fax
machines, as well as personnel time to deal with the unsolicited faxes.
136
Further, the evidence showed that fax advertisements interfered with the
recipient's use of their fax machines by preempting the telephone line
used by the fax machine for the time it takes to receive the unsolicited
message.
1 37
The lower court believed that there was not a substantial govern-
mental interest in restricting unsolicited fax advertising.' 38 Further, even
if a substantial governmental interest could be reasoned, the court con-
cluded that the § 227(b)(1)(C) restriction would neither "materially alle-
viate the asserted harm" nor was the restriction "sufficiently narrow."
139
Finding that the restriction on commercial speech was unconstitutional
under the Central Hudson test, the lower court dismissed the action
brought by Missouri and the United States. 140 The Eight Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the lower court's holding that § 227(b)(1)(C) of the
TCPA violated the First Amendment. 141
The Eighth Circuit found that the government had a substantial in-
terest in restricting unsolicited fax advertisements and need not support
its assertions with empirical studies at trial. 142 Because the commercial
and noncommercial content was relevant to the asserted governmental
131. Am. Blast Fax, 323 F.3d at 660.
132. Id. at 652.
133. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C § 227(b)(1)(C)).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Am. Blast Fax, 323 F.3d at 652.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 653 (noting that "empirical data on costs or evidence that the majority of unsolicited




142. Id. at 655.
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interest, the Eight Circuit distinguished the instant case from Discovery
Network. 143 Both the purpose behind proscribing commercial speech and
the magnitude of commercial speech as compared to noncommercial
speech being proscribed were key facts relevant to the goal of reducing
the costs and interference associated with unwanted faxes.'
44
In American Blast Fax, a complete ban on unsolicited fax advertis-
ing was upheld. In contrast, the national do-not-call registry at issue in
Mainstream Marketing provides an opt-in feature that permits individu-
als to determine whether or not they wish to ban the commercial speech
of telemarketers. The less restrictive regulatory scheme of the national
do-not-call registry allows this commercial speech proscription to "easily
satisfy" the Central Hudson test.145  Unless the most absurd rationale is
provided for a given regulation, 46 the Central Hudson test provides al-
most no First Amendment protection for commercial speakers when in-
dividuals, not the government, choose whether to receive the commercial
speech.
B. The Problem Addressed by the National Do-Not-Call Registry Should
Have Been Left to Market Forces
Irrespective of the constitutional validity of the national do-not-call
registry, this government act was superfluous because market forces
were in place to solve the same problem as the legislation. The problem
that the government sought to remedy was the multitude of annoying
calls made by telemarketers to individual's homes. 147 Telephone service
providers had created products like Caller ID, which allows consumers to
see the number of the caller before they answer the phone, and even
more specialized privacy-centric products to solve this same problem of
intrusive telemarketing calls. 148 "Public policymakers in the regulatory
and legislative arenas have a variety of choices for the telecommunica-
tions industry ranging from a total reliance on market forces at one end
143. Id.
144. Id. at 656.
145. See Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 13-14, Mainstream Mktg. Services, Inc. v.
FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1552). The FTC highlighted that the do-not-call
regulations differ significantly from the kinds of laws typically at issue in First Amendment cases
because they do not establish a government-imposed ban on speech that some individuals may wish
to hear, but rather establish a framework to enforce consumer's own choices about commercial
speech and privacy in their own homes. Id. Understood in this manner, the do-not-call regulations
easily satisfy the standard established in Central Hudson. Id. at 14.
146. See e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 436 (1993) (striking
down a local ordinance prohibiting 62 commercial newsracks out of 1,500 to 2,000 total newsracks
for the alleged reason of reducing litter).
147. See Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1235; see also Sweet, supra note 74, at 922. While
both protecting privacy rights of consumers and curbing the risk of telemarketing abuse are identi-
fied as the two goals of the national do-not-call registry, stopping telemarketing calls from reaching
individuals ostensibly eliminates any possibility of fraud associated with those calls.
148. See e.g., Brian Quinton, Ameritech Declares War On Telemarketers: Caller ID Feature
Lets Customers Turn Away Callers, TELEPHONY, Sept. 28, 1998, at * 1.
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of the spectrum to continued reliance on invasive government regulation
at the other."
' 149
Faced with customer dissatisfaction regarding the increasing num-
ber of unsolicited telemarketing calls received, telephone service provid-
ers designed enhanced services to address the growing problem. 50  For
example, Privacy Manager, a feature that compelled callers from blocked
or unidentified numbers to identify themselves or have their call rejected,
was a product resulting from additional customer demand for privacy.' 51
By working in tandem with the Caller ID service, unidentified incoming
calls were intercepted before they could ring through. 152 The operation
of this feature would work to block all telemarketers,153 not just commer-
cial telemarketers as the national do-not-call registry does.
1 54
Given that market forces existed, why did Congress proceed with
the Do-Not-Call Act? Congress may have believed that the market
forces were insufficient, or perhaps their directive was aimed at garner-
ing goodwill from the public and ensuring continued political telemarket-
ing activity. 55  Because consumers are more likely to choose the free
149. William R. Drexel, Telecom Public Policy Schizophrenia: Schumpeterian Destruction
Versus Managed Competition, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5, 117 (2004) (discussing regulatory efforts in the
context of promoting competition between telecommunications carriers).
150. See Quinton, supra note 148, at *1.
151. See id. "Privacy Manager" is a feature typical of all major telecommunications providers,
and privacy-related products are still offered by the major telephone service providers. SBC offers
Privacy Manager, Verizon offers Call Intercept, Bell South offers Privacy Director, and Qwest offers
Caller ID with Privacy. Privacy Manager, at http://wwwOl.sbc.com/ProductsServices/Residential
/Prodlnfo_1/1,,97--6-3-0,00.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2005); Call Intercept, at
http://www22.verizon.conforyourhome/sas/ProdDesc.asp?ED=6063&state=NY&CategorylD=93
(last visited Jan. 27, 2005); Privacy Director, at http:l/www.bellsouth.comlappslipc/
ICReqDispatcher?userEvent=displaySearchDetailsEvent&offerGroupld= 145&segmentld=
2  (last
visited Jan. 27, 2005); Caller ID with Privacy, at http://pcat.qwest.com/pcat/pmductDetail.do?
salesChannel=Residential&offerld-6615 (last visited Jan. 27, 2005).
152. Quinton, supra note 148, at *1. When a customer with the service receives incoming calls,
a recording asked the callers to state their name. Id. at *2. If the caller complied, the call was com-
pleted, told the customer who was calling, and gave the customer the option to (1) accept the call, (2)
reject it politely, or (3) play a recording that explained that the customer did not accept telemarketing
calls and wanted to be placed on the telemarketer's company specific "do-not-call" list. Id.
153. See id. at *2.
154. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1240, 1246. Company-specific do-not-call lists remain for
individuals to block to for charitable and political telemarketing calls, although the FTC indicated
that the company-specific lists were ineffective in the commercial context.
155. Acknowledging this likely inference, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation addressed this in its Amicus Curie Brief:
Do-Not-Call is not some newfangled concept rushed into regulation on an impulsive po-
litical tide. It is rather a concept that has evolved over time, as Congress and two federal
agencies have labored to balance the compelling societal interest in the protection of the
privacy of the home with the free speech interests of telemarketers. Congress in 1991
passed the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S. § 227 ("TCPA"). The law was
enacted "to protect residential telephone subscribers' privacy rights to avoid telephone
solicitations to which they object." The FCC was directed to promulgate regulations that
restricted the use of automatic telephone dialing systems.
The FTC exempted charitable organizations from the do-not-call requirements. The FTC
made this exception partly in deference to the heightened First Amendment protection af-
forded to charitable speech. The FITC also found that abusive telemarketing practices of
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national do-not-call registry over privacy features for which service pro-
viders charge a fee,' 56 Congress ensured that political and charitable con-
tributions from individuals remained unaffected by the regulation.
There is no questioning the efficacy of the national do-not-call reg-
istry, 15 7 and the national do-not-call registry arguably resolved the prob-
lem of excessive and annoying telemarketing calls quicker than would
have market forces. However, leaving the problem of annoying telemar-
keting calls to market forces in the telecommunications industry would
have been a better solution than implementing a paternalistic regula-
tion. I5 8 The Do-Not-Call Act was about combating privacy intrusions,
and any reference to fraud reduction objectives of the regulations is, at
best, insultingly paternalistic, and, at worst, completely disingenuous.
Closing a legitimate access channel to goods and services as a means to
combat the fraud of some does not make sense. Would Congress shut
down Wal-Mart to protect consumers from fraud by some of the makers
of products sold in the retail chain? Would Congress shut down the
NYSE because several companies scammed investors out of their retire-
ment savings? No, it would be an absurd application of cause and ef-
fect.
American consumers are savvy enough to handle a pushy salesper-
son on the end of a telephone, just as they are capable of handling a
pushy or fraudulent salesperson on a car lot, and did not need the gov-
ernment to step in to protect them. The result of thirteen years of legisla-
tive initiatives and taxpayer dollars for reports, orders, briefs, trials, and
appeals is that the American citizens no longer have to spend a few sec-
onds a day either ignoring or answering a commercial telemarketing call
and saying, "no thank you."
C. Future Implications for Commercial Speech in a Convergent Tele-
communications Marketplace
Was the Do-Not-Call Act an anomaly or just the beginning of regu-
lations aimed at commercial speech? As demonstrated in Mainstream
the sort the registry sought to combat were more likely to be undertaken by commercial
telemarketers than those soliciting charitable and political contributions. The FCC fol-
lowed suit, ultimately adopting rules that paralleled those of the FTC.
Senate Committee Brief, supra note 45, at 43-44 (internal cites omitted). But cf Mainstream Mktg.,
283 F. Supp. 2d at 1167 (stating this argument to exclude charitable and political telemarketers must
fail because there is no evidence before the District Court that abusive and fraudulent practices are
more often instigated by commercial telemarketers, and, in fact, the importance of repeat business
provides a commercial telemarketer with an incentive to act in a responsible and decorous manner).
156. See supra note 151. Each privacy-related product costs between $5-10 per month, some
with an additional $6-9 installation fee.
157. See Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1240.
158. See ROBERT CORN-REVERE, RATIONALES AND RATIONALIZATIONS: REGULATING THE
ELECTRONIC MEDIA 10-11 (1997). "Regulation must be applied only as 'a last recourse,' and 'the
burden of proof is for the least possible regulation of communication."' Id. This principle is one of
four First Amendment visionary Ithiel de Sola Pool proposed to guide freedom of expression into the
digital age.
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Marketing, residential privacy interests easily trumped commercial
speech under the Central Hudson test.159 The most significant fact in the
Tenth Circuit's constitutional analysis of the do-not-call registry was that
it "is an opt-in program that puts the choice of whether or not to restrict
commercial calls entirely in the hands of consumers." 6 Further, the
Supreme Court appears to be "extremely vigilant in shielding the sanctity
of the home from unwanted communications ... as long as the statutorily
approved method of preventing the communication involves some af-
firmative action by the homeowner."161 Technological advances in tele-
communications equipment, coupled with the limited First Amendment
protections afforded commercial speech, place additional privacy in the
home regulations within the reach of Congress.
Compared to the radio broadcast technology that served as the
backdrop for the Communications Act of 1934,162 modern telecommuni-
cations equipment provides functionality that gives end-users control of
the information they receive. Information is transmitted from one place
to another in the form of signals. Digital encoding and packet-switching
of signals allow for a more cost efficient telecommunications network.
163
The destination of packet-switched signals must be known prior to
transmission, and the device receiving the packets of information has
control over whether it will accept or deny them.' 64 Therefore, the in-
formation control functionality in modern telecommunications equip-
ment 165 could act as an enabler for additional privacy-related government
regulations.
1. The Dawn of the Convergent Telecommunications Industry
Congress passed the landmark Telecommunications Act of 1996166
("Telecom Act") representing the most significant overhaul of the Com-
159. See Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 13-14, Mainstream Mktg. Services, Inc. v.
FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1552).
160. See Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1233; see also Brief for Respondent in Opposition at
13-14, Mainstream Mktg. Services, Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1552).
Without the opt-in function, the do-not-call registry acts as a prior restraint creating a more signifi-
cant constitutional hurdle. The govemment would be forbidding certain communications in advance
of the time that such communications are to occur. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31,
§ 11.2.3.1 (discussing prior restraint concerns).
161. Shannon, supra note 127, at 385 (emphasis added) (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dept, 397
U.S. 728 (1970)). Regulations that require affirmative action by consumers should survive any
constitutional challenges that telemarketers might bring under the First Amendment. Id. This argu-
ment is equally applicable to constitutional challenges that any commercial broadcast marketer
might bring under the First Amendment. See discussion infra Part IH.C.2.
162. Communications Act of 1934,47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934).
163. See RAY HORAK, SYSTEMs & NETWORKS: VOICE, DATA, AND BROADBAND
TECHNOLOGIES 205 (1997).
164. Id.
165. See e.g., Matthew Scherb, Free Content's Future: Advertising, Technology, and Copy-
right, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1787, 1794 (2004). "Interactivity means that consumers have more control
over content. More control over content means consumers can more easily manipulate content to
avoid.., advertisements .... " Id.
166. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1996).
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munications Act since its inception in 1934.167 The 1996 Act confirmed
the transition of the telecommunications industry from a closed system of
regulated monopolies to an industry driven by competition and techno-
logical advance.' 68 "Rather than unleashing the competitive gale of crea-
tive destruction .... federal regulators again perpetuated a paradoxical
regulatory dichotomy between the technologically converging wireless
and coaxial cable voice and broadband worlds on the one hand and the
twisted pair telephony voice and broadband world on the other."'
169
While varied across certain segments of the telecommunications indus-
try, each provision of the 1996 Act "ha[s] a similar purpose-to bring
regulations in line with evolving technological and economic reali-
ties.,' 7( As a result of changes in the regulatory landscape and technol-
ogy, cable, wireless, and telephone now compete directly with one an-
other. Furthermore, any company can or will be able to offer telephone,
internet, and video products and services over similar digital packet-
switched networks.
171
In Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC,172 the Supreme Court
acknowledged forthcoming convergence of telecommunications and real-
ized cable companies were in a unique position to benefit from conver-
gence. "Given the pace of technological advancement and the increasing
convergence between cable and other electronic media, the cable indus-
try today stands at the center of an ongoing telecommunications revolu-
tion with still undefined potential to affect the way we communicate and
develop our intellectual resources.' 73 Convergence has become a reality
for cable television, 74 but that advantage could become a detriment with
167. Drexel, supra note 149, at 6.
168. ZUCKMAN, supra note 35, § 9.1.
169. Drexel, supra note 149, at 2.
170. See ZUCKMAN, supra note 35, § 9.3, at 717 (noting that the regulations imposed on radio
and television broadcasting were less drastic than the regulations opening the local telephone market
to competition imposed on telephone carriers). For example, the Title 11 provisions of the 1996 Act
recognize that in a "multichannel world of cable television, direct broadcast satellite, and the Inter-
net," no one provider in the broadcast industry "controls the only source of electronic mass commu-
nication." Id. Consequently, regulations based on the premises of "spectrum scarcity and broad-
caster power" are becoming obsolete and substantially reduced. See id.
171. See 2 FRANK W. LLOYD, CABLE TELEVISION LAW 2003: COMPETITION IN VIDEO,
INTERNET AND TELEPHONY 147 (2003). There is a strong economic force for broadband carriers to
converge multimedia services into one platform because economies of scale and scope are realized.
See id.; see also JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS:
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 23-30 (2005).
172. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
173. Turner, 512 U.S. at 627.
174. Cable television "was not originally intended to be a general-purpose communications
mechanism." See WALTER CICIORA ET AL., MODERN CABLE TELEVISION TECHNOLOGY: VIDEO,
VOICE, AND DATA COMMUNICATIONS 5 (1999). Since its inception, cable television networks have
primarily utilized a broadcast architecture--one-way signal transmission from a central location to
each customer's home. Id. The signals received at one customer's home are the same as the signals
received by every other customer's home served by the same central location or distribution point.
Id. The central location or distribution point in a cable television network is called a headend. Id. A
cable network's "primary and often sole purpose is the transportation of entertainment television
signals . I..." ld. However, recent changes in cable technology from a one-way analog broadcast
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significant financial implications should Congress attempt to use the
technological advances that accompany convergence to proliferate com-
mercial speech regulations similar to the national do-not-call registry into
digital television,"' In fact, the FCC has implemented regulations in-
tended to hasten the conversion of the nation's television broadcast sys-
tem from analog to digital television technology. 76 The hastening of a
conversion to digital television may be in part Congress's desire to im-
plement further commercial speech regulations.
2. Is a National Do-Not-Advertise Registry Next?
Recognizing the potential regulations that could ensue in the wake
of Mainstream Marketing, the current FFC administration publicly an-
nounced that it would not create a similar national "do-not-spam" regis-
try to control the problem of invasive and fraudulent commercial internet
advertisements.117  Further, the FTC stated that its decision to restrain
from such legislation "presents a perfect opportunity for telecom carriers
to step up to a leadership position" on this problem. 78  In its report to
Congress, the FTC indicated that a national do-not-spain registry, fash-
ioned after the hugely popular national do-not-call registry, would be
ineffective and possibly increase spam, yet implied it would be an easily
implemented solution for telecommunications service providers.1 79 Ap-
plication of a "do-not-spam" registry rests on identifying the originators
of commercial emails or pop-up advertisements. 180 Once the final tech-
nological hurdles regarding identification are resolved, a national do-not-
architecture to a two-way hybrid-fiber coax architecture allow digital transmission and permit the
electronics at the customer's home to be intelligent devices. See id. at 18. "The hybrid fiber-coax
(HIFC) architecture is an optimized combination of fiber in the trunk and coaxial cable in the [distri-
bution network]" that makes "it possible to cost-effectively increase bandwidth, signal quality, and
reliability ... ." Id. Two-way signal transmission, communications both from the headend to the
home and from the home to the headend, becomes practical with a hybrid-fiber coax network be-
cause transmission paths are reduced and signal interference is drastically minimized. Id. at 19.
These two conditions, shorter transmission paths and low signal interference, enable low-power
electronic devices at a customer's home to transmit on the return path back to the headend. See id. at
576.
175. See Scherb supra note 165, at 1791 (noting that "total television advertising revenue came
in at about $44.8 billion for 2001 ... [and] [albout 44% of that figure went for network spots, about
33% went for broadcast spots, and the remainder, about 23%, went for cable spots").
176. Second Periodic Review of the Commission's Rules and Policies Affecting the Conver-
sion to Digital Television, Report and Order, FCC-04-192, Sept. 7, 2004, available at
http://www.fcc.gov.headlines2004.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
177. Vince Vittore, Spare This, TELEPHONY, June 21, 2004, at 28.
178. Id. This type of regulatory threat is not uncommon. See e.g. CORN-REVERE, supra note
158, at 46. "Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.) similarly has described broadcasting regulation as a
'social compact' based on an explicit 'quid pro quo,' and lectured industry witnesses at congres-
sional hearings that broadcasters would be unlikely to receive favorable consideration in legislation
to reform communications infrastructure unless the industry supported his 'V-chip' proposal." Id.
179. See Vittore, supra note 177, at 28; see also New System to Verify Origins of E-Mail Must
Emerge Before "Do Not Spam" List Can Be Implemented, FTC Tells Congress, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa2004/06/canspam2.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
180. National Do Not Email Registry: A Report to Congress, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/dneregistry/report.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
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span registry would neither be any more complex nor any more of an
administrative burden than its do-not-call counterpart.
In Mainstream Marketing, the FTC expressed a substantial govern-
mental interest in protecting privacy in the home. Was Congress's goal
in promulgating the Do-Not-Call Act to safeguard residential privacy a
means to other ends, or a genuine interest in enabling individuals to
choose whether or not to be subject to commercial speech within the
sanctity of their homes?' 81 If the answer is the latter, a similar opt-in
commercial speech regulation will likely be promulgated against the
biggest commercial speech intrusion in one's home, television commer-
cials.
18 2
Applying the Central Hudson test in the context of an opt-in regula-
tion of television commercials could prove extremely complicated.
Courts have found the Central Hudson test difficult to apply toward
various types of commercial speech. 183 Following Central Hudson and
subsequent cases, "the commercial speech doctrine ha[s] been seriously
weakened . . , leaving much, though by no means all, commercial
speech vulnerable to governmental regulation."' 84 However, the opt-in
181. See CORN-REVERE, supra note 158, at 11 (commenting that "the culture of regulation is
motivated more by political imperatives than by constitutional values"). As an example, "the special
urgency with which the FCC and the White House approached the children's IV issue was not
unrelated to the fact that 1996 was a presidential election year." Id. The long gridlock in the FCC's
proceedings "ended only after the White House scheduled a 'summit' on children's TV and engaged
in down-to-the-wire negotiations with the National Association of Broadcasters." Id. "These issues
... were a key part of President Clinton's campaign for reelection, and were incorporated into the
Democratic platform." Id.
182. The possibility to change the highly commercialized culture of American society exists
should Congress wish to implement a bold initiative like a television commercial regulation modeled
after the national do-not-call registry.
[W]hat sorts of policy goals or interests count as reasonable in regulating commercial
speech? As we suggested, even nondeceptive commercial speech can sensibly be regu-
lated in the name of environmental protection or nutritional education, for example. A
more interesting question might center on the claim that a culture of commercial con-
sumption does not promote freedom and well-being as much as we had hoped. Could a
government cite that very belief, by itself, as a reasonable grounds for regulating com-
mercial speech?
WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 75. After Mainstream Marketing, the answer is residential privacy, which
by itself provides all the justification necessary for regulating commercial speech.
183. See Deborah J. La Fetra, Kick It Up A Notch: First Amendment Protection For Commer-
cial Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1205, 1216 n.76 (2004) (arguing that a more straightforward
and stringent test for assessing the validity of governmental restrictions on commercial speech has
been growing in intensity in recent years); see also ZUCKMAN, supra note 35, § 3.3.A, at 220
(criticizing the four-part test of Central Hudson because "it requires highly subjective judgments by
judges as to the substantiality of state's interest in regulation, the efficacy of the particular regulation
involved and the permissible breadth of the regulation.").
184. ZUCKMAN, supra note 35, § 3.4.C, at 228. The section further discusses the unanswered
question "whether the [Supreme] Court would apply the Central Hudson test in a conscientious
manner or would continue to erode.., its limited protection in order to permit government to regu-
late commercial expression concerning admittedly legal products, services and activities which
legislatures, administrative agencies and a majority of the justices feel are harmful to the public
good." Id. With respect to telemarketing calls, the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari would imply
that the intrusion to privacy in the home by such a form of advertisement is harmful enough that it be
prohibited should an individual choose. See Mainstream Mktg., 125 S. Ct. at 47.
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character of a commercial speech regulation ensures that any speech di-
rected at the home of a willing listener will not be inhibited, thereby sat-
isfying the "narrowly tailored" requirement of the Central Hudson test.
85
Nevertheless, Congress should stop at the Do-Not-Call Act before
further residential privacy regulations do irreparable harm to the non-
commercial content supported by advertisements.1 86 Although techno-
logically possible and constitutionally valid, the government should re-
frain from enacting laws that place residential privacy interests above the
interest of commercial speakers because the "public's supply of content
will diminish, perhaps to the vanishing point[,]" should broadcaster and
video service providers lose the advertising revenue that supports free
content. 187
CONCLUSION
The national do-not-call registry is a constitutionally valid regula-
tion of commercial speech under the Central Hudson test. The Central
Hudson test provides commercial speakers almost no First Amendment
protection in the context of the Do-Not-Call Act's opt-in regulatory
scheme, which places the decision to proscribe commercial speech that
enters the home in the hands of individuals. However, the do-not-call
registry was a superfluous governmental intervention because market
forces were in place to solve the privacy concerns of residential tele-
phone consumers. Moreover, it is a paternalistic regulation that provides
a diminutive consumer protection benefit.
Privacy in the home is a powerful individual right. The Mainstream
Marketing decision demonstrates the supremacy that residential privacy
has over commercial speech. More so than telephone solicitations,
commercial speech enters individuals' homes through television adver-
tising and has little First Amendment protection in that private forum.
With a national do-not-call registry in full force and do-not-spam regula-
tions on standby, Congress could take the next logical step and enact opt-
in regulations restricting television commercials.
In the convergent telecommunications industry, all media content
will be transmitted digitally, and information control functionality in end
user equipment allows content to be identified and eliminated prior to
185. See Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1238. Several differences between television com-
mercials and telephone and internet solicitations could possibly tip the scales in favor of commercial
speech over privacy concerns. For example, regulations on television commercials could be consid-
ered as burdening an excessive amount of speech or less of an intrusion to privacy in the home.
186. See Scherb supra note 165, at 1791 (commenting that "[w]hcther creative or not, whether
enjoyable or not, advertisements enable consumer access to an unbelievably large amount of content
without charge").
187. See id. at 1823.
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viewing, whether packetized or encoded in a digital format.'88 With
some minor technological adjustments, government-initiated do-not-
advertise regulations could empower individuals to assert their privacy
right to its fullest and eliminate television commercials in their homes,
and along with them, revenues for broadcasters and video service pro-
viders that help offset costs for programming content. Congress should
restrain from enacting further privacy legislation now enabled by techno-
logical advances and allow the marketplace to determine how commer-
cial speech reaches or doesn't reach consumers.
Jeffrey E. Santry*
188. See HORAK, supra note 163, at 207-08; ZUCKMAN, supra note 35, § 13.4.B.2, at 1115-23
(discussing the V-Chip regulation of programming content); see also Scherb supra note 165, at 1795
(describing that as "technology on the consumer end becomes more complex, and there are more
possibilities for enhancing, altering, or otherwise customizing" video content and commercials, and
that it has "never been so easy for end users and intermediary relayers to remove advertisements
from transmitted content").
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